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Distortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise mainly from the exemption of specific 
services and sectors. This paper develops an analytical model that is applicable to any sector 
characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions of services and activities or differentiated tax 
rates.  We  analyze  the  effects  of  such  asymmetric  tax  regimes  on  market  shares,  optimal 
prices, tax receipts, and social welfare. The analytical model shows how asymmetric VAT 
exemptions distort competition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. 
The net effect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of VAT-rated inputs versus the 
fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate the main competitive impact of VAT 
policies while showing their consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results 
based on a calibrated quantitative model of a selected sector. Our paper provides guidance on 
how  to  resolve  the  policy  trade-off  between  a  level  playing  field,  consumer  surplus,  and 
government tax revenue. 
Keywords: Value-added tax, indirect taxation, tax regulation, tax exemption, social welfare, 
competitive effects 
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1  Introduction 
The value-added tax (VAT) has been adopted in more than 130 countries over the last half-
century.  In  particular,  all  OECD  countries  with  the  exception  of  the  United  States  have 
introduced VAT. Proponents of VAT claim that it is a particularly effective tax that reduces 
the welfare costs of raising revenue. However, the tax should be raised such that it does not 
lead to significant distortions in competition (Keen and Lockwood 2006). Unfortunately, this 
is not always the case. 
According to Aujean et al. (1999), distortions under VAT arise mainly from exemptions 
for  specified  services  and  sectors.  As  Cnossen  (2003)  argues,  the  rationale  for  most 
exemptions lies in the history of their adoption and not in “their underlying economic or 
administrative  logic”.  For  instance,  countries  that  have  adopted  VAT  only  recently  (e.g., 
Australia, Canada or New Zealand) follow “best practices” by taxing most of the services that 
are exempt in countries with a long history of VAT (e.g., member states of the European 
Union).  
The postal sector is a good example of such a distortion because most member states of 
the  European  Union  (EU)  exempt  universal  postal  services  provided  by  the  incumbent 
operator from VAT on the grounds that they are the “public postal service.” At the same time, 
competing  postal  service  providers  must  charge  VAT  at  the  standard  rate.  Recently,  the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) essentially confirmed this interpretation of the current VAT 
Directive.
1 According to the ECJ, universal service tariffs are VAT exempt unless prices are 
individually negotiated with customers. The decision of the ECJ is binding on all member 
states.  The  postal  sector  is  therefore  a  good  candidate  to  illustrate  comprehensively  the 
competitive effects of VAT regimes.  
Our paper focuses on the competitive and welfare effects of different VAT regimes in 
sectors with asymmetric VAT exemptions. Where such exemptions exist, the competitive 
effects are ambiguous a priori. While an exempt firm cannot reclaim VAT paid on inputs 
(which is relevant for non-labor inputs only) and therefore faces higher costs, ceteris paribus, 
an important fraction of the customers of non-exempt firms will not be able to deduct VAT 
themselves. Therefore, the exempt firm has a cost disadvantage on the one hand and a price 
advantage on the other. The net effect will depend on the fraction of non-labor inputs relative 
to the fraction of non-rated customers.
2 
                                                         
1 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the EU member states 
relating to turnover taxes. 
2 Figure 1 in Section 3 illustrates this trade-off.        4 
To analyze the effects of different VAT scenarios, we develop an analytical model that is 
applicable  to  any  sector  characterized  by  asymmetric  VAT  exemptions  of  services  and 
activities or differentiated tax rates. In a second step, we calibrate the model for a specific 
sector: the postal market. This approach enables us to quantify the competitive and welfare 
effects of the selected tax regimes. The various scenarios differ regarding the firms’ fraction 
of labor input and their rating status. We also take into account the fraction of non-rated 
customers that cannot deduct VAT themselves. Thus, our paper provides a well-founded basis 
for assessing the main competitive impact of VAT policies while showing the consequences 
on  overall  welfare.  Finally,  we  assess  the  policy  trade-off  between  a  level  playing  field, 
consumer surplus and government tax revenue. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. 
Section  3  introduces  the  model  framework  and  presents  the  analytical  results.  Section  4 
describes the calibration of the model for the postal sector. Section 5 reports the simulation 
results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes our study.  
 
2  Literature Review 
Before  proceeding  with  the  model,  we  present a  s h ort  literature  review.  Cnossen  (1998) 
examines various VAT structures and argues that the application of VAT on public-sector 
bodies has the advantage of confronting policymakers more directly with the full cost of 
public intervention. Competitive conditions are distorted if the government’s services bear a 
lower tax or no tax while competing private-sector services are taxed in full. He concedes, 
however,  that  the  prices  of  government  services  are  often  regulated  or  subsidized,  which 
makes the levy of VAT little more than a bookkeeping exercise, as the effect of the VAT can 
be exactly replicated by the exemption. Keen and Lockwood (2006) use panel data for the 
OECD and empirically test whether VAT is a “money machine.” They find that countries 
with VAT raise more revenue than those without. However, the effect may not be large. Keen 
(2007) examines in detail the criticisms that VAT faces today. Giesecke and Tran (2010) 
analyze  the  VAT  characteristics  of  multi-production,  legislated  differences  in  exemption 
status,  and  industry-specific  differences  in  the  refundability  of  VAT  paid  on  inputs  to 
production and investment in a general equilibrium framework. Finally, PWC (2007) discuss 
various  forms  of  market  distortions  resulting  from  VAT  exemptions  for  financial  and 
insurance services.  
In the postal sector, VAT exemptions have been addressed in recent years. Dieke and 
Elixmann (2005) quantify the effect of such exemptions for postal operators on government       5 
tax  revenue.  De  Donder  et  al.  (2009)  focus  on  the  pricing  and  welfare  implications  of 
changing a postal operator’s VAT status. Crew et al. (2009) discuss the importance of VAT 
exemptions in the framework of the prospective study by PwC (2006). Relative to the work of 
De Donder et al. (2009), who assume that entrants act as a competitive fringe, we model 
profits of both the incumbent and new market entrants. This allows us to provide a more 
comprehensive  treatment  of  the  competitive  effects  of  VAT  policies.  We  also  provide  a 
relevant sensitivity analysis with regards to the fraction of labor inputs and the fraction of 
non-rated  customers.  We  show  that  the  results  are  very  sensitive  to  the  operators’  labor 
policies. Consequently, VAT exemptions have a different impact in countries with different 
labor regulations. Secondly, the sensitivity analysis highlights that the competitive effects will 
vary strongly between different customer segments. Therefore, there is a second important 
regulatory  link  between  VAT  exemptions  and  uniform  pricing  constraints.  The 
comprehensive treatment of competition and welfare enables us to provide guidance on how 
to resolve the policy trade-off between consumer surplus, government tax revenue, and a level 
playing field markets with VAT exemptions. 
 
3  The Analytical Model 
3.1  Notation and Assumptions 
Two firms (operators) denoted by I and E offer differentiated services in the same market.
3 
The before-tax price of firm   is given by , whereas   denotes the after-tax 
price of firm i, with   being the VAT rate of firm i. Moreover, each firm pays VAT 
given  by   on  non-labor  inputs.  Depending  on  their  VAT  status,  firms  are  able  to 
deduct the input VAT from their output VAT billed to their customers.  
Following Dietl et al. (2005) and Jaag and Trinkner (2009), we define the total utility of a 
representative customer as
4 
                                       
  (1) 
where   and  .  The  parameter   characterizes  the  amount  of 
money spent on other goods;   and   represent the demands faced by firm I and firm E, 
                                                         
3 The firms (operators) are denoted with I and E because we calibrate the model with market data from a selected 
sector (postal market) in Section 4. As mentioned, in postal markets, the (historical) incumbent operator I is 
usually VAT exempt, whereas the entrant operator E is VAT rated. 
4 Note  the  quasi-linearity  of  the  utility  specification  that  will  later  allow  us  to  compute  monetary  welfare 
measures.        6 
respectively. The last term in Equation (1) reflects the fact that the services offered by the two 
firms  are  differentiated  products.  A  smaller  parameter   indicates  a  higher  degree  of 
differentiation. The parameters   and   determine the market shares of firm I and firm E, 
respectively, whereas   determines the slope of the demand functions. In our model, there 
are  two  types  of  customers:  VAT-rated  and  VAT-exempt  customers.  For  simplicity,  we 
aggregate these to one representative customer. Her/his budget constraint is given by  
         (2) 
where   denotes the fraction of exempt, “non-rated” customers and   is the 
proportion of customers that are rated.
5 The latter type of customers can reclaim the VAT they 
paid on their products because these products are an input in their own production processes. 
Reclaiming VAT is not possible for exempt customers. Therefore, for rated customers, the 
before-tax price  is relevant, whereas for exempt customers, the after-tax price   
from firm i is relevant. The model specification presumes that the fraction of non-exempt 
letters is the same for both firms.  
From Equations (1) and (2), we determine the demand faced by firm i in the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1 
The linear demand function for the product of firm (operator) i is given by 





αi − εα j − pi(1+γti)+ εpj(1+γtj) ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦,         (3) 
with   and  . 
Proof: The representative customer maximizes utility   under her/his budget constraint   
and thus solves 
   

















 subject to (xI,xE) ∈B
with B = (xI,xE) ∈R+
2 | y = m+ pI xI(1+γtI) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦+ pE xE(1+γtE) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ { }.
 
The Lagrange function is given by 
   
L(xI,xE,λ) = u(xI,xE)− λ(m+ pI xI(1+γtI) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦+ pE xE(1+γtE) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦− y). 
By computing the first-order conditions of the Lagrange function and solving the resulting 
equation systems, we derive 
                                                         
5 More precisely,   represents the fraction of demand from its VAT exempt business (e.g., banking), while 
whereas   represents ordinary commercial business activities that are rated.        7 










αE − εαI − pE(1+γtE)+ εpI(1+γtI) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦.
                  QED
 
 
Note that the slopes of the linear demand functions are equal for both firms. We further 
see that the demand of firm i decreases in its own price   but increases in the price   of the 
other firm j. Demand is also positively related to a higher degree of product differentiation (a 
smaller  ); that is,  . 
If firm   is VAT exempt (i.e.,  ), it does not charge VAT to its customers, but it does 
charge VAT to its customers if it is rated (i.e.,  ). The effect of different VAT regimes 
 on  , that is  , will depend on the second-order effects of 
a change in the tax rate  . However, these second-order effects are ambiguous, as we will see 
below.  
On the cost side, firm i is assumed to face three types of costs: (i) fixed costs  , (ii) 
constant marginal upstream costs   (e.g., collection and sorting in the postal sector), and (iii) 
constant marginal downstream costs   (e.g., mail delivery in the postal sector). The fraction 
of the fixed costs that is non-labor is denoted by  , whereas   stands for the 
fraction of marginal upstream and downstream costs that are non-labor costs. Note that firm   
has to pay VAT, given by  , on the fraction of non-labor costs derived from fixed costs, 
upstream and downstream costs independent of its VAT status. 
We thus specify total costs faced by firm (operator)   as 
                                                         (4) 
with   and demand   given by Equation (3). For notational simplicity, we denote the 
sum  of marginal upstream and downstream costs with   in the subsequent analysis: 
that is,  . 
The cost function shows that the VAT status crucially determines the costs faced by firm 
. For example, if firm   is VAT rated with  , it can reclaim the VAT it has paid on 
inputs such that  . Conversely, if firm   is non-rated, that is, VAT exempt with       8 
,  it  cannot  reclaim  the  VAT  it  has  paid  on  inputs  such  that 
   Ci
nr = (1+ µi
Ft)Fi + (1+ µit)cixi. 
The (net of tax) profit of firm (operator)   thus amounts to 
   
πi = pixi − 1+ µi(t − ti) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ci ⋅xi − 1+ µi





pi − 1+ µi(t − ti) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ci
β(1− ε
2)









with   and  . 
The model framework basically reflects the situation as shown in Figure 1 below. It is 
generally applicable to any industry with asymmetric VAT exemptions. Firm I is exempt from 
VAT (tI = 0), whereas firm E is fully rated (tE = t). This will be Scenario A in the subsequent 
analysis.  
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Disadvantage rated firm: Exempt 
customers cannot reclaim VAT!
fraction 1-! 
fraction ! 
Disadvantage exempt firm: It  cannot 
reclaim tax paid on external inputs!      9 
3.2  Optimality Conditions 
To  derive  its  optimal  pricing,  firm   solves  the  maximization  problem  .  The 
corresponding first-order conditions are computed as
6 







αi − (1+γti) 2pi − (1+ µi(t − ti))ci ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦− ε(α j − pj(1+γtj)) ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ = 0. 
From the first-order conditions, we obtain the reaction function   for firm   as 




1+ µi(t − ti) ( )ci +















with   and  .  Solving  the  system  of  reaction  functions  yields  the 
equilibrium before-tax price   of firm (operator)   as 





2 2 1+ µi(t − ti) ( )ci + ε
1+γtj
1+γti












,          (5) 
with   and  . 
It  is  intuitive  that  the  before-tax  price   of  firm   increases  with  higher  marginal 
upstream and downstream costs  . Similarly, it is straightforward that   also increases with 
higher marginal costs   of the competitor .  
We further derive that a higher tax rate   of competitor   induces a higher before-tax 
price   of firm   if the proportion   of VAT exempt customers is sufficiently large with 
. Note that firm j’s amount of input tax (measured by  ) plays a crucial role. 
As   is usually significantly larger than zero (see calibration section), the condition will be 
satisfied if   is sufficiently close to zero (e.g., an operator mainly employing labor directly 
instead of via subcontractors). In such a case, an increase of firm j’s tax   will degrade its 
competitive position, as non-rated customers face higher prices that cannot be compensated 
for by input tax deductions. Therefore, firm i will be able to increase its price profitably. On 
the  other  hand,  the  effect  of  a  higher  own  tax  rate   on  the  own  before-tax  price   is 
ambiguous. It depends on  and the relative tax status of the two firms. 
                                                         
6 The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied, as 






< 0.       10 
To derive further insights, we analyze two scenarios: in Scenario A, firm I is VAT exempt, 
whereas firm E is VAT rated. In Scenario B, both firms are VAT rated. 
 
3.3  Scenario A: Firm I is VAT exempt and Firm E is VAT rated 
In Scenario A, we assume that firm   is VAT exempt, that is,  , whereas firm   is 
VAT rated, that is,  . Because firm E is rated, it can reclaim the VAT it has paid on 
inputs, while this is not possible for the exempt firm I. 
From Equation (5), we compute the before-tax price   of firm (operator)   in Scenario 
A by setting   and   










Similarly, the before-tax price   of firm (operator)   is computed as  
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Substituting equilibrium prices   in the demand functions given by Equation (3) 
produces equilibrium demands   in Scenario A as 


















Note the close similarity of the two demand functions; only   and   are switched. The 
functions illustrate the trade-off that we have discussed: input tax disadvantage vs. output tax 
advantage.  With  symmetric  costs  and  demands,  firm  I w i l l   have  a  larger  market  share 
whenever  . Note that the parameter  depends on the labor policy of the firm. Ceteris 
paribus, being VAT exempt will make it more profitable for the firm to employ workers 
directly than via subcontracting as compared to being VAT rated.  
In the next proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher tax rate   on equilibrium prices 
and demands in Scenario A: 
 
 
       11 
Proposition 1  
(i)  A  higher  tax  rate   always  yields  an  increase  in  the  before-tax  price   of  the  VAT-
exempt  firm  I,  while  the  before-tax  price   of  the  VAT-rated  firm  E  decreases  for  a 
reasonable range of parameters, that is, 




< 0 ⇔αI <
γ −µI
γ cI + 2−ε2
ε αE. 
(ii) A higher tax rate   induces a decrease in the equilibrium demands   of the VAT-
exempt firm and the VAT-rated firm if 
 
is in a reasonable range of parameters, that is, 
   
∂xI
A(t)














ε ( ). 
Proof:  To  prove  part  (i),  we  compute  the  partial  derivative  of   and   with 
respect to   as 































We further derive 
   
∂pE
A(t)
∂t > 0 ⇔αI >αI
′ ≡
γ −µI
γ cI + 2−ε2
ε αE. 
To prove part (ii), we compute the partial derivative of   and   with respect to   
and further derive 






































                  QED
 
 
Part (i) of the proposition shows that the before-tax price of the exempt firm I always 
increases in the tax rate. If the model parameters are within a reasonable range, then the 
before-tax price of the rated firm E decreases in the tax rate. This result can be explained by 
two effects: (a) because firm I cannot deduct VAT, higher taxes will directly lead to higher 
production costs, and (b) a higher tax rate will increase firm I’s output tax advantage as the 
increased  VAT  rate  is  directly  price  relevant  for  firm  E’s  non-rated  customers.  Under 
reasonable calibration assumptions (i.e., a minimal number of non-rated customers relative to 
the size of  ), firm E will be forced to reduce prices to offset the increase in taxes without 
gaining market shares in return. Marginally, firm I is able to increase prices. Therefore, the       12 
two  effects  always  have  the  same  direction  for  the V A T -exempt  firm,  whereas  they  are 
ambiguous for the VAT-rated firm.  
Under  reasonable  calibration  assumptions,  both  effects  will  negatively  affect  demand. 
Analytically,  this  is  shown  in  part  (ii)  of  Proposition  2.  For  a  reasonable  parameter 
constellation of  , both types of firms will respond to a higher tax with lower quantities. 
 
3.4  Scenario B: Both Firms are VAT rated 
In Scenario B, we assume that firm I and firm E are VAT rated; that is,  . It 
follows that both firms can reclaim the VAT they have paid on inputs. 
From Equation (5), we compute the before-tax price   of firm (operator)   in Scenario 
B by setting  : 
 
Similarly, the before-tax price   of firm   is given by  
 
Substituting equilibrium prices   in the demand functions given by Equation (3) 
produces equilibrium demands   in Scenario B as 
 
Except for the cost structure and the market shares, the two equilibrium demands are now 
equal and independent of the fraction of VAT rated inputs. Therefore, this VAT regime does 
not distort competition between the two firms (operators); consequently, Scenario B can be 
seen  as  the  benchmark  case  for  Scenario  A’s  market  distortions  driven  by  firm  I’s  VAT 
exemption. 
In the next proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher tax rate   on the equilibrium 
prices and demands in Scenario B. 
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Proposition 2 
(i) A higher tax rate   yields a decrease in the before-tax prices   of firm I and firm E 
if  the  ratio  of  market  sizes   is  within  a  reasonable  range  of  parameters,  that  is, 
   
∂pI
B(t)












ε ( ). 
(ii) A higher tax rate   yields a decrease in the equilibrium demands   of firm I and 
firm E if the ratio of cost parameters   is within a reasonable range of parameters, that 
is, 
   
∂xI
B(t)












ε ( ). 
Proof:  To  prove  part  (i),  we  compute  the  partial  derivative  of   and   with 
respect to   and further derive 
 
Note that if  , then the tax rate t has no effect on the equilibrium prices for both firms. 
To prove part (ii), we compute the partial derivative of   and   with respect to   
and further derive 
 
Note that if  , then the tax rate t has no effect on the equilibrium demands for both firms. 
QED 
A higher VAT tax rate will decrease before-tax prices for both firms in Scenario B under 
reasonable market conditions. Although the fraction of firm I’s non-labor inputs   is no 
longer relevant, as the firm can now deduct input taxes as well, a tax increase will lead to 
higher prices for the non-rated customer segment. To offset some of the resulting volume 
reductions, the firm will be forced to reduce their before-tax prices, ceteris paribus.  
In equilibrium, total demand will decrease for both firms because the increase in VAT 
introduces a new cost for non-rated customers. Moreover, a higher parameter   reinforces the       14 
negative effect of t on the equilibrium demands for both firms. Note that if  , then the tax 
rate t has no effect on the equilibrium demands. 
 
3.5  Comparison of Scenarios A and B 
Comparing Scenarios A and B, we can establish Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3  
(i) The before-tax price of the entrant is lower in Scenario A than in Scenario B if and only if 
the proportion   of VAT-exempt customers is lower than the fraction   of upstream and 
downstream costs that is non-labor, that is, pE
A < pE
B ⇔ γ < µI . 
(ii) The before-tax price of firm I is higher in Scenario A than in Scenario B for a reasonable 
range of parameters, that is,
   
pI
A > pI
B ⇔ µI > γ




Proof:  To  prove  part  (i),  we  compute  the  difference  of  firm  E's  before-tax  price  in 
Scenarios A and B and derive  
 
To prove part (ii), we compute the difference of firm I's before-tax price in Scenarios A 
and B as 




1+γt ( )(εγcE + 2µIcI)−γ (αEε −αI(2− ε
2))
(4− ε
2) 1+γt ( )
> 0. 
We further derive  
   
pI
A > pI
B ⇔ µI > γ
ε(αE − cE(1+γt))+ (2− ε
2)αI
2cI(1+γt)
.                                     QED 
 
Part (i) of Proposition 3 shows that the relation between the fraction of non-labor upstream 
and downstream costs and the proportion of VAT-exempt customers crucially determines 
whether the before-tax price of firm E is higher in Scenario A or B. Therefore, if   is smaller 
than  , firm I’s VAT exemption will translate into a disadvantage from firm E’s point of 
view  and  force  firm  E  to  reduce  prices,  ceteris  paribus.  Note  that  with  regard  to  postal 
markets, this is the likely scenario, as incumbents (firm I) often have a high percentage of       15 
labor  costs  (i.e.,  >0.5),  whereas  the  fraction  of  non-rated  customers  does  not  usually 
exceed 50% (i.e.,  ).  
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 mirrors the results of Part (i). Whereas firm E will be forced to 
decrease prices, ceteris paribus, firm I will be able to increase its price under reasonable 
calibration assumptions. Therefore, VAT exemptions are likely to strengthen the competitive 
position of firm I. 
 
4  Calibration 
To predict competitive and welfare effects more precisely, we simulate the analytical model 
presented in Section 3 by using stylized market data for a selected sector with asymmetric 
VAT exemptions. We have chosen the postal sector because it provides a good example of 
such a distortion. In particular, we calibrate the model to reflect the B2C bulk mail market.
7 
This is the mail segment in which competition is most likely to take place in a fully liberalized 
postal market. Firm I represents the incumbent operator (universal service provider), whereas 
firm E is the entrant operator. Scenario A represents the standard situation in the EU postal 
markets in which only the historical (incumbent) operator is VAT exempt, whereas the entrant 
operator has to charge VAT at the standard rate. In Scenario B, both the incumbent and the 
entrant operator are VAT rated. 
To calibrate parameters   and  , we assume that incumbent I as a monopolistic operator 
in the market would deliver one billion bulk mail items at an average price of 0.35 units of 
money per item with a point-price elasticity of -0.5. Note that the demand function given in 
Equation (3) is linear, which results in the price elasticity decreasing in quantity.      
Parameters   influence the size of the market of the two operators’ services. By setting 
, we can include effects such as customer inertia, reputation effects, switching costs, 
or even quality differences in favor of the incumbent (universal service provider). Formally, 
we define   as the percentage of total demand the incumbent serves if the entrant offers the 
very same price for its services (“incumbent advantage”). For the calibration, we evaluate 
demand given in Equation (3) with a price of 0.35 for both operators and solve the resulting 
equation system. We obtain 




; pI = pE = p = 0.35;  α E = 1
1−ε+ε
φ
αI (ε −1+ 1
φ)+ p(1− ε)(2− 1
φ) ( ). 
                                                         
7 For more calibration details, see Dietl et al. (2005, 2010).        16 
In the simulation, we set  ; that is, the entrant would get 20% of the market if it 
were to offer the very same services as the incumbent. A value of 50% would mean that 
customers have symmetric preferences for the two operators.
8  
As mentioned, parameter ε measures how different the two products of the two operators 
are; a value close to one would mean that the products are very close substitutes. Consistent 
with previous model calibrations (e.g., Dietl et al. 2005), we set  . 
Parameter   represents the fraction of VAT-rated customers. The value varies across mail 
segments. For example, in the C2C segment,   is close to zero, as private customers cannot 
reclaim VAT. For the base case, we assume   to reflect the bulk mail market. The 
value is in line with the current situation, such as the German letters market, where DPWN 
reported a 50% fraction of non-rated customers in 2009. 
On the supply side, cost needs to be differentiated in the three dimensions: variable/fixed, 
upstream/downstream and labor/non-labor costs. The latter is relevant for the deduction of 
input  VAT  because  non-labor  costs  are  VAT  rated.  In  the  monopolistic  calibration 
benchmark, we assume costs of 250 million units of money excluding input taxes. In line with 
the demand calibration, the cost structure of the incumbent is calibrated for a hypothetical 
monopolistic situation. We thus assume a reasonable rate of return such that the initial price 
of 0.35 represents a rate-of-return regulated monopoly.
9   
Table  1  shows  the  major  cost  assumptions.  With  these,  we  are  able  to  compute  the 
necessary parameters to calibrate the two cost functions as introduced in Equation (4). 
 
Table 1: Major Cost Assumptions Base Case 
  Incumbent  Entrant 
Fraction of fixed costs  50%  20% 
µ
F (fraction of VAT-rated fixed costs)  =µI  =µE 
µ (fraction of VAT-rated variable costs)  30%  70% 
Efficiency premium upstream  -  10% 
Efficiency premium downstream   -  30% 
Wage premium  -  - 
 
We assume that the entrant pursues a different business model in the base case with lower 
fixed costs because it makes use of subcontracting in delivery, rendering the cost structure 
more flexible (variable) and yielding a larger fraction of VAT rated inputs. We also assume 
                                                         
8 See Jaag (2007) for a discussion of consumers’ switching behavior in the mail market. 
9 By doing so, we are able to report the results for the monopoly benchmark. Because we are mainly interested in 
competitive effects, we will not report these results.       17 
that the entrant is more efficient upstream (by more strongly incentivizing digital sorting) and 
downstream (with a reduced delivery frequency). The lead example of such a business model 
is the Dutch company Sandd. Similar models can be found in other liberalized postal markets. 
To illustrate the distortive effects of VAT with regard to outsourcing, we assume that both 
players pay equal wage rates. 
The quasi-linear model framework allows for a computation of overall welfare by adding 
up  consumer  surplus,  operators’  profits  and  governmental  tax  revenues.  The  effect  of 
changing postal VAT regimes on governmental tax revenues can be computed as follows. In 
the case that the USP is exempt, the total VAT tax base is the value of the USP’s input goods 
plus the product value of the USP’s customers’ output that is rated. If the USP is rated, the tax 
base is the value of the USP’s output to exempt customers in addition to the product value of 
the USP’s customers’ output that is VAT rated. Whether the difference in the two cases is 
positive thus depends on the USP’s value added and the fraction of rated customers. It is 
positive if the fraction of exempt customers is larger than the inverse of the USP’s relative 
value added. In the next section, we will compute the relevant overall welfare measures.  
 
5  Numerical Results 
The  calibrated  model  allows  for  some  insight  into  the  overall  competitive  and  welfare 
consequences of various tax regimes using the example of the postal sector. In addition, we 
perform sensitivity analysis and derive recommendations for regulators, market players, and 
VAT authorities. Note that the quantitative results presented in this section serve as rough 
guidelines only.
10  
We report simulation results for the two Scenarios A (incumbent is VAT exempt, tI = 0) 
and B (both operators fully rated at ti = t = 20%). We are interested in (i) competitive effects 
measured  by  market  shares,  prices,  and  profits;  (ii)  welfare  effects;  and  (iii)  changes  in 
collected VAT. We compute the latter against a benchmark scenario where both operators are 
VAT exempt (tI = tE = 0). 
 
5.1  Base Case 
Table 2 reports the results for the base case as introduced in Section 4. The base case includes 
three different VAT scenarios. In Scenario 0, both operators are VAT exempt. Scenario A is 
the  standard  case  in  the  European  postal  markets,  where  only  the  historical  (incumbent) 
operator  is  VAT  exempt.  In  Scenario  B,  both  operators  are  fully  rated.  The  results  that 
                                                         
10 More detailed simulation results are provided in Dietl et al. (2010).       18 
illustrate the competitive effects are shown in the upper part of the table, whereas those that 
show the welfare effects are reported in the lower part.   
 
Table 2: Simulation Results Base Case    (µI = 0.3,µE = 0.7)  
 
The comparison of Scenario A and B illustrates the competitive distortions of asymmetric 
VAT exemptions.   
In the base case, Scenario A is more favorable for the incumbent. Compared to Scenario B 
in which both operators are fully rated, the incumbent’s profit increases substantially, whereas 
the entrant’s profit decreases slightly. Both price and profit ratios are substantially higher for 
the  incumbent  in  Scenario  A,  meaning  that  the  incumbent  can  charge  higher  prices  in 
Scenario A in relative terms and earn a higher profit at the same time. Despite its higher price 
level in Scenario A, the incumbent achieves a higher market share. The figures show that the 
tax exemption is distorting competition significantly.
11  
Nevertheless, Scenario A exhibits a slightly higher overall welfare level than Scenario B.
12 
There are two opposite welfare effects at work; as a result of the incumbent’s VAT rating, the 
                                                         
11 With the following exception, the results are in line with recent decisions of Deutsche Post DHL to reduce its 
letter prices for business customers significantly in light of the new VAT regime in Germany as of July 1, 2010. 
Deutsche Post announced net price decreases equal to the VAT rate itself, which is significantly more than we 
predict in our simulation.    
12 Our welfare results differ from those reported by De Donder et al. (2009), which yield higher welfare in 
Scenario B. Whereas the authors also report higher consumer surplus in Scenario A, they multiply government 
tax revenues by 1.3 to reflect the shadow cost of public funds and therefore find higher overall welfare in 
Scenario 0 Scenario A Scenario B
Individual VAT rate I (tI) 0% 0% 20%
Individual VAT rate E (tE) 0% 20% 20%
Competitive Effects
Incumbent Market Share 64.8% 64.1% 63.7%
Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 118% 131% 120%
Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 118% 109% 120%
Profit Ratio (I/E) 1755% 455% 212%
Profit I 21,979,609           20,051,777           11,013,273          
Profit E 1,252,698             4,410,232             5,196,978            
Welfare Effects
Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.33 0.32 0.30
Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.33 0.34 0.36
Operator Profits 23,232,307           24,462,009           16,210,251          
Consumer Surplus 372,849,153         375,231,196         372,755,232        
Incremental Government Tax Revenue -                      -3,582,967            6,069,580            
Overall Welfare 396,081,460         396,110,238         395,035,064              19 
average marginal tax rate in the industry increases. This lowers welfare. However, as the two 
operators are equally rated, there is a level playing field, and competition is more intense, 
which  increases  welfare.  Whereas  incremental  profits  are  roughly  compensated  for  by 
opposite incremental tax effects (the profit decrease of the incumbent in Scenario B equals 
roughly the tax increase of the tax authority), customers are slightly better off in Scenario A. 
The positive effect comes from the 50% non-rated customers who face lower net prices than 
they do in Scenario B.
13  
The comparison of Scenario 0 and Scenario B illustrates the distortive impact of VAT on 
internal labor policies. If both operators are exempt from VAT (Scenario 0), there is a strong 
incentive  to  use  internal  workforce  because  input  VAT  on  outsourced  labor  cannot  be 
deducted and hence outsourcing is less attractive, ceteris paribus. Consequently, the entrant’s 
competitive position is much stronger in Scenario B, where the input VAT can be deducted. 
Note that we treat the operators’ cost structures as exogenous in both scenarios. In practice, 
operators would be likely to optimize their labor policy and increase the share of internal 
workforce in Scenario 0, whereas Scenario B will be competitively neutral in this regard. To 
sum up, abolishing the incumbent’s VAT exemption levels the playing field (in the market 
itself and in the outsourcing market) while it slightly decreases overall welfare in the base 
case. 
 
5.2  Effect of Different Cost Structures µI  and µE 
Our analytical results presented in Section 3 indicate that the effects crucially depend upon 
the relative magnitude of the parameters   and  . Whereas   is exogenously given, the cost 
structure   can be optimized by the operators. The fraction of rated inputs for the entrant, 
, is not relevant for the entrant’s decision making if it is fully rated (i.e., in Scenarios A 
and B); a higher value of   indicates larger VAT expenses, which, however, can be fully 
deducted from the VAT billed to the customers. For the tax authority, the net effect matters, 
as we report the difference in a scenario with both operators being exempt. Therefore, a 
higher µE increases the input tax deduction that the entrant can reclaim.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
Scenario B. As we are interested in the relative effects of the postal sector, we weigh all three components of 
welfare equally and generally do not account for second-order effects in other parts of the economy.   
13 Note that this effect stems from the fact that we do not allow for price differentiation between customers 
segments. Therefore, the operators are forced to balance over the two customer segments yielding lower net 
prices for the rated customers. While we could extend the model to capture the relevant effects, regulations in 
many countries (e.g., Germany) will not allow differentiated prices for the incumbent.        20 
In contrast to  , changes in   are of great importance for the market equilibrium in 
Scenario A in which the incumbent is exempt. Here, changes in   are directly cost relevant; 
outsourcing to equally efficient partners will increase costs by the VAT rate times the amount 
of the outsourced input goods. In Scenario B, µI is irrelevant for the market equilibrium (in 
analogy to µE above).  
 
Table 3: Simulation Results for Different Combinations of µI and µE 
 
Table 3 reports the competitive effects of different cost structures.
14 Scenario A1 and A2 
differ in µI but not in µE (i.e., we obtain the same results for all  ). Scenario A1 
represents an incumbent that uses employees mainly. Scenario A2 indicates an incumbent 
business model with subcontractors in delivery. 
Whereas the share of non-rated inputs is generally irrelevant in Scenario B, it is of great 
importance in Scenario A for the operator that is exempt. In contrast to the relative prices, the 
operators’  profits  change  substantially  when  comparing  Scenarios  A1  and  A2.  The 
incumbent’s VAT exemption is an advantage in Scenario A1 and a disadvantage in Scenario 
A2, where incumbent profits are lower. The results are in line with our analytical findings. 
Note that in Scenario A1, µI < γ , while we have µI > γ in Scenario A2. We conclude that the 
net competitive effect of an asymmetric VAT exemption crucially depends on the fraction of 
                                                         
14 Remember that the fraction of VAT-exempt (non-rated) customers is set to  .       21 
VAT-rated inputs versus the fraction of non-rated customers. In the base case, the latter effect 
compensates for the former and the exempt incumbent has a competitive advantage. 
In terms of overall welfare, a higher µI decreases welfare in Scenario A, as the higher 
perceived costs of the incumbent reduce its profits and slightly increase average prices in the 
market  (lower  consumer  surplus).  In  Scenario  B,  operator  and  consumer  surplus  remain 
unaffected. Abolishing the incumbent’s VAT exemption decreases welfare in Scenario A1 (µI 
< γ), whereas it increases welfare in Scenario A2 (µI > γ). Therefore, from a public policy 
point  of  view,  the  incumbent’s  VAT  exemption  is  desirable  in  a  scenario  in  which  the 
incumbent’s  fraction  of  non-labor  costs  is  relatively  low.  Conversely,  if  the  fraction  is 
relatively high, the VAT exemption reduces welfare because it induces higher prices.
15 
In  most  European  countries,  incumbent  operators  do  not  predominantly  make  use  of 
outsourced labor (i.e., µI is relatively low). Therefore, VAT exemptions for bulk mail can be 
justified  from  a  welfare  perspective  in  countries  with  a  substantial  fraction  of  non-rated 
customers, even though such exemptions distort competition clearly in the incumbent’s favor. 
 
5.3  Effects of Different Combinations of γ and µI 
Our  analytical  results  in  Section  3  have  shown  that  the  competitive  effects  of  VAT 
exemptions are crucially driven by the relative size of γ and µI . The results provided in Table 
3 have confirmed the analytics.  
Figure 2 provides a series of 3D-plots to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the competitive effects of the two VAT regimes in Scenarios A and B. The 3D plots depict the 
operators’ profits in the two-dimensional space defined by   and  , i.e., all 
feasible combinations of   and  .
16 Figures 2-1 and 2-2 depict the profits of the incumbent 
and entrant for Scenarios A and B, respectively. Figure 2-3 illustrates the profits of the two 
operators in Scenario A, while Figure 2-4 displays the differences in the operators’ profits 
between Scenario A and the undistorted Scenario B.
17  
The figures confirm the analytical findings from Section 3, and they also replicate the 
results presented in Section 5.2 regarding the impact of the operators’ cost structure.  
 
 
                                                         
15 Note that this differentiation is not captured in the simulation results reported by De Donder et al. (2009). 
16 Apart from that we use in Figure 2 the same parameter constellations as in Scenarios A and B in Section 4.2. 





curvature is only very weak for   and  .        22 
Figure 2: Competitive Effects of Scenario A and B 
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the ambiguous effect of VAT exemptions for non-rated (incumbent) 
operators.  Such  operators  will  be  strengthened  in  market  segments  with  a  relatively  high 
fraction γ of non-rated customers (e.g., industrial customers), whereas they will be worse off 
in  segments  with  a  relatively  high  fraction  of  rated  customers  (e.g.,  banks  and  private 
customers). Because exempt operators will optimize their capital structure toward a low value 
of µI, they are likely to be better off in Scenario A and opt for a VAT exemption.  
Figure 2-2 shows the entrant’s perspective. The profits of the VAT rated entrants are 
strictly decreasing in γ independently of the Scenario. It will prefer Scenario B whenever γ > 
µI.
18 As the incumbent is likely to choose a low value of µI in Scenario A, the entrant is likely 
to opt for Scenario B in policy discussions.  
Figure 2-4 confirms these findings. It further shows that in the relevant parameter range 
(i.e., low µI), the competitive advantage of exempt operators in non-rated market segments is 
more important than their disadvantage in rated market segments.  
                                                         










Figure 2-3: Operators’ profits in Scenario A  Figure 2-4: Operators’ change in profits 
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6  Conclusions  
Distortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise mainly from the exemption for specified 
services and sectors or from differentiated rates within an industry sector. The list of these 
exempt services and sectors include activities undertaken by public sector bodies, such as 
medical and hospital care, welfare and social security work, the provision of education and 
university education and the supply of certain cultural services. Furthermore, non-commercial 
activities  carried  out  by  public  radio  and  television  stations  are  also  exempt  from  VAT. 
Another example is the postal sector where the universal service providers are usually exempt 
on the grounds that they are the “public postal service”. Other postal service providers are 
VAT rated at the standard rate (cf. Trinkner 2009 for a recent overview). 
In this paper, we develop a general model framework that can be applied to any sector in 
which firms competing in the market face asymmetric VAT rates. The model framework 
enables us to analyze the effects of such asymmetric tax regimes on market shares, optimal 
prices,  tax  receipts  and  welfare.  The  analytical  model  shows  how  asymmetric  VAT 
exemptions distort competition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. 
The net effect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of rated inputs versus the 
fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate the main competitive impact of VAT 
policies while showing the consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results 
based on a calibrated quantitative model of the postal sector.  
With  a  reasonable  model  calibration,  the  VAT  exemption  positively  affects  profits  of 
exempt operators and degrades profits of rated operators. Therefore, it strengthens the exempt 
operators’ relative competitive position and results in an unlevel playing field. In the postal 
sector,  this  implies  that  tax  exemptions  for  universal  service  providers  may  reduce  their 
burden represented by the net cost of universal service obligations.
19 Our simulation results 
further show that the exemption has a positive effect on consumer surplus. Compared to the 
scenario  without  VAT  exemption,  it  has  a  small  but  positive  welfare  effect  in  that  the 
marginal tax rate is lower on average.  
The different VAT regimes also have an effect on the make-or-buy decisions of operators 
because  VAT-exempted  operators  have  a  higher  incentive  to  employ  their  own  workers 
instead  of  subcontractors.  VAT  exemptions  thus  raise  a  second  set  of  market  distortions 
because they worsen the competitive position of external suppliers. 
                                                         
19 See Jaag (2010) for a discussion of the unfair burden resulting from universal service obligations in the postal 
sector.       24 
Our paper may help policymakers assess the main competitive effects of VAT policies in 
sectors  that  are  characterized  by  asymmetric  VAT  exemptions.  Moreover,  it  can  provide 
guidance  on  how  to  resolve  the  policy  trade-off  between  a  level  playing  field,  consumer 
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